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ABSTRACT  
   
The lack of food safety in a grower's produce presents the grower with two 
risks; (1) that an item will need to be recalled from the market, incurring substantial 
costs and damaging brand equity and (2) that the entire market for the commodity 
becomes impaired as consumers associate all produce as being risky to eat. Nowhere 
is this more prevalent than in the leafy green industry, where recalls are relatively 
frequent and there has been one massive E. coli outbreak that rocked the industry in 
2006. The purpose of this thesis is to examine insurance policies that protect 
growers from these risks. In doing this, a discussion of current recall insurance 
policies is presented. Further, actuarially fair premiums for catastrophic revenue 
insurance policies are priced through a contingent claims framework. The results 
suggest that spinach industry revenue can be insured for $0.02 per carton. Given the 
current costs of leafy green industry food safety initiatives, growers may be willing 
to pay for such an insurance policy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Motivation 
Food safety is an issue for which consumers and producers are equally 
interested.  The consumer seeks a product that has no health risk and the producer 
seeks to meet that need with a product that exposes the firm to as little business 
risk as possible.  It is therefore desirable for all parties involved to trade with 
products that are 100% safe (that is, completely absent of any risk).  This, however, 
is not realistic.  Despite developments in food safety technology, stricter regulations, 
and increased awareness of food safety issues, food products will always carry some 
risk of disease or injury to those who consume it, and thus will continue to represent 
a substantial business risk to producers and handlers in the supply chain.   
 When a firm encounters an eminent need to prevent the consumption of a 
dangerous food product, one mechanism that has been increasingly used is the 
product recall (Skees et al., 2001).  Recall events are costly to producers as well as 
firms further down the value chain, and ultimately can result in the shutdown of a 
business.  Such events which correspond to a contamination and outbreak may also 
have a direct impact on other businesses producing similar products as seen in the 
E. coli outbreak in spinach in 2006. 1  The outbreak ultimately cost the spinach 
industry an estimated $200 Million because consumers associated all spinach as 
being risky to eat (Richards et al., 2009). 
 
                                               
1 For a full timeline of the 2006 E. coli outbreak in spinach see Appendix A. 
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In the face of such drastic outcomes, growers indeed desire some level of food 
safety for their own operations, which is in turn enjoyed by all firms in the industry.  
This inherent non-excludability of individual food safety investments gives rise to 
the problem of free riders.  That is, firms which benefit from a safer industry, but do 
not make investments themselves.  While this problem presents firms with 
disincentive to invest in food safety, each firm still has a need to maintain some level 
of food safety in order to protect itself (Richards et al., 2009).   Food safety, then, is a 
public good where the benefits of having the greatest food safety standards are 
mitigated (though not entirely) by the firm with the weakest food safety standards.  
The result of this weaker-link public good effect is that investment in food safety is 
slow despite the drastic consequences of an outbreak and recall (Richards et al., 
2009).   
In order to create uniform food safety standards for all firms, certain 
industries have taken measures such as marketing agreements to encourage and 
enforce food safety standards that are above those required by government through 
regular auditing.  While this is often viewed as the best public/private strategy to 
improving food safety, it only raises the minimum requirement and does not give 
incentive for any one firm to invest more than it needs to in order to meet those 
standards.  Further, these agreements are strictly voluntary so that firms not 
participating in the agreement do indeed benefit without actually investing in 
compliance with industry standards.  From a liability standpoint, Buzby and 
Frenzen (1999) find that legal incentives to invest in food safety are weak, with far 
less than 0.01% of all foodborne illness cases being litigated and of those only 56% of 
plaintiffs were awarded any compensation (a median of $2000 before legal fees).  In 
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order to protect consumers with little legal recourse, the FDA has been given 
expanded powers including mandatory recall authority (FSMA, 2011).  
In recent years new risk transfer tools have become available for the specific 
purpose of mitigating the effects of product recall events.  Various insurance 
companies have developed recall insurance policies that cover individual expenses 
and loss of profit in some cases. While policies of this kind help mitigate the risks of 
a recall at the firm level, they do not protect the industry against devastating 
market declines resulting from a food safety scare.  The effect of the systematic risk 
of a recall on the market has been recognized in the 2012 Farm Bill which contains a 
provision for research related to food safety insurance in specialty crops (S.3240, 
2012). Thus an insurance policy which protects industry participants from 
precipitous declines in revenue resulting from a food safety scare could complement 
existing marketing agreements, and serve to address food safety as a weaker-link 
public good. 
Objectives 
The objective of this research is to put forth a model for insurance designed to 
mitigate food safety risks, and bolster incentives to invest in food safety.  In doing 
this, this thesis provides an overview of the specific recall insurance policies 
currently available.  While these insurance products help indemnify food safety risks 
at the firm level, they do not provide broad-based protection against rapid declines 
in price and/or disruptions in volume which may arise from a recall event.   
Therefore, a revenue insurance policy that is triggered by industry-wide price and/or 
volume declines as a result of a recall event is evaluated.  In doing this, this research 
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examines several candidate revenue insurance policies and estimates actuarially 
fair premiums using a contingent claims framework.  The conceptual and empirical 
analysis is conducted in the context of an operation that produces and ships leafy 
greens (specifically, fresh spinach), an industry in which contamination and recall 
events are serious and relatively frequent. 2  The remainder of the thesis is outlined 
as follows: the next section provides a survey of the literature pertaining to the 
nature of public goods, food safety, and the role of insurance in food safety.  The 
theory behind a firm’s response to risk is discussed and a discussion of insurance 
policies currently on the market is presented.   Models of revenue insurance are then 
presented and actuarially fair premiums are simulated.  These actuarially fair 
premiums are considered vs. the current costs of the check-off program for leafy 
greens.  Doing this provides insight into the cost of such an insurance scheme to the 
growers relative to current industry assessment rates. 
  
                                               
2 Leafy green produce items include the following: arugula, butter lettuce, chard, 
escarole, iceberg lettuce, red leaf lettuce, spinach, baby leaf lettuce, cabbage (green, 
red and savoy), endive, green leaf lettuce, kale, romaine lettuce, spinach, and spring 
mix (LGMA 2012). 
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BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE 
Cornes (1993) puts forth a model for the production of a non-excludable 
public good that can be used to explain contributions to food safety on the part of an 
individual grower of a perishable commodity.  Cornes (1993) concludes that, in terms 
of producing optimal levels of a public good, losses in efficiency are especially high 
when the preferences to the allocation of income toward the public good are 
heterogeneous across firms in the industry.  Cornes (1993, p. 270) writes, “It is 
precisely in such situations that there may be strong incentives for individuals to 
bind themselves to an alternative institutional structure for public good provision.”   
To the extent that decisions regarding food safety depend on the actions of rival 
firms, the problem of weaker-link public goods is a game theory problem and the 
cooperative agreement suggested by Cornes (1993) is a solution.  Assuming that the 
negotiation among all growers is beneficial (and compulsory) to all, cooperation is an 
appropriate strategy to avoid the situation that is least desirable (in this case, 
industry-wide loss and shut down of firms due to product contamination).   
Although cooperation to avoid such an event may indeed be desirable, it may 
not provide the most profitable solution (Luce and Raiffa, 1957).   Antle (1995) 
suggests that in this case, there may be incentive to cheat (in the form of freeriding) 
on the cooperative agreement and thus Gresham’s Law of Product Quality applies.  
This is where consumers cannot tell the difference between products that increase 
the probability of injury and those that do not, such that reputations for quality 
cannot be established.  Thus, if the cost of producing a higher quality product (in 
terms of food safety) is greater than the cost of producing a lower quality product, 
then the lower quality product may chase the higher quality product out of the 
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market until the market for the safe product is completely gone (Antle, 1995).  If 
indeed cooperation among all parties is beneficial, but subject to market forces in 
competition, the question then becomes a matter of how best to structure such a 
cooperative mechanism.  Though Cornes’ work suggests that an institution outside 
of the consumers of the public good can best address the weaker-link phenomenon, 
his work leaves the structure of such an institution to another paper.    
Richards et al. (2009) focuses on measuring the public good effect in the 
spinach industry and suggests that the weaker-link public good phenomenon 
inherent in food safety may be addressed using a combination of policies, one of 
which could be an insurance institution from which growers receive a payout in the 
event of a recall.  Skees et al. (2001) draws on policies on the market to inform a 
discussion on the potential of recall insurance to enhance food safety in that recall 
insurance could motivate earlier recalls and more diligent implementation of food 
safety standards, which ultimately can lead to a safer industry.  The only known 
model for such insurance in the literature comes from Turvey (2006); a book chapter 
that provides a conceptual loss-function for disease in livestock.  This provides 
insight into the mathematical feasibility insuring such risks to the extent that 
principles of a disease outbreak in livestock (i.e. the frequency, duration, and 
intensity of a contaminant) are applicable to disease outbreaks in other products. 
  Turvey’s (2006) work also uses a contingent claims framework to price 
revenue insurance with path-dependent options.  Turvey’s (2006) conceptual 
analysis is adapted by Mojduszka (2004) in a more general sense to analyze the role 
of food recall liability insurance to promote food safety, and proposes that insurance 
is an important component of interdependent public-private food safety controls 
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which are the dominant strategies for ensuring food safety today.  Henson and 
Hooker (2001) analyze firm-level compliance decisions and note that these decisions 
are made through a complex interplay between market forces, food safety regulation, 
and product liability law.  This interplay of regulatory and market forces induces a 
strategic response to food safety regulation which present firms with negative 
incentives to deviate. 
Strategies to address quality standards in food have often revolved around 
information gathering and sharing.  For example, buyers in the fresh produce 
industry have traditionally employed inspectors who go to the farm and report on 
issues of quality to buyers.  This auditing function, known in the industry as “bird-
dogging,” is common practice among retailers who require information on particular 
commodities before purchase.   While bird-dogging has long served buyers with 
information, it is primarily a way of assessing desirable physical qualities, which are 
relatively easy to ascertain, and not for the testing of product for contaminants.  
Indeed, buyers trying to assess such a risk would necessarily incur increased search 
costs as inspectors would need to be trained in chemical analysis and conduct such 
analysis across many producers.  Further, the hiring and training of such inspectors 
could create its own public good effect among buyers.  That is, if one or a few buyers 
employ trained inspectors who do an adequate job in assessing contaminants, why 
should another buyer pay to conduct the very same analysis?  Addressing this issue 
are private third-party food safety auditors employed by producers to maintain a 
certification which signals to buyers that the product conforms to a set of food safety 
standards.  While many producers participate in this kind of auditing, it is not a 
uniform requirement across all firms.  
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In order to efficiently provide information regarding the safety of food 
products across all firms, nearly all producers and handlers in the leafy green 
industry (99%) have agreed to mandatory government audits in an initiative called 
the California Leafy Green Products Handler Marketing Agreement (CALGMA) and 
the Arizona Leafy Green Marketing Agreement (AZLGMA).  Both agreements assess 
money from industry members to provide education, training, government auditing, 
and certification services in the industry.  For a firm to be certified under an 
agreement they must submit to mandatory government audits which seek to enforce 
the AZ/CALGMA’s rigorous food safety standards.  If during the course of such 
audits it is found that a member is not in compliance, the agreement board issues a 
fine or decertifies the organization.  Certified members carry the marketing 
agreement seal on all sales documents as a signal to buyers and end consumers that 
the product adheres to the safety standards of the agreement. 
In this way, the marketing agreement shifts search costs for buyers to the 
producers who employ a single entity (the government) to gather and share 
information that would otherwise be costly to consumers to ascertain themselves.   
While the effectiveness of such agreements is a subject for another paper, it 
illustrates that auditing and information sharing arrangements are pivotal in food 
safety policy.  However, such agreements are entirely voluntary and there is an 
ongoing effort by federal regulatory forces to encourage membership on a national 
level. To this end, the USDA has proposed a new marketing agreement for leafy 
greens open to all producers in the country.  The proposed marketing agreement is 
known as the National Leafy Green Marketing Agreement (NLGMA) and seeks to 
include all other firms outside of those in California and Arizona which deal in leafy 
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green produce.  Because the proposed marketing agreement is voluntary, producers 
and handlers must choose to take part in it and, due to the weaker-link public good 
nature of food safety, full industry participation becomes imperative in order to 
achieve its stated objectives. 
If a firm chooses to submit to a marketing agreement, it pays a per unit 
check-off price and it will likely need to invest in food safety measures to bring itself 
into compliance with the agreement.  As Richards et al. (2009) show, this is indeed a 
problem of public goods and economic hysteresis.  However, if it is possible to embed 
insurance premiums into the marketing agreement, growers may be more apt to 
participate as their participation would prevent their firm from ever being 
completely wiped out in the face of an outbreak.  Indeed, the chief benefit of 
participating in a marketing agreement for food safety is to reduce the chances of an 
outbreak that has a detrimental impact on the market for a commodity.  So it stands 
to reason that if the agreement included an insurance policy, growers may be more 
apt to join.  However, a grower’s decision to insure is entirely empirical.  Given the 
volatility of returns in leafy greens, most such growers are highly diversified and, 
perhaps more importantly, often choose the gamble over the insurance contract.  
Thus it is important to consider the grower’s appetite for risk along with the price of 
insurance. 
The Grower’s Appetite for Risk 
At the grower level, decisions made with regard to food safety are defined by 
the grower’s appetite for risk.  Food safety (the absence of risk in food) is provided up 
to the point at which the marginal benefit of improving the product is equal to its 
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marginal cost.  Because this will never be at a level of zero risk, growers will seek to 
allocate income to maximize utility under risk.  While no universal utility function 
for this exists, Von Neuman and Morgenstern’s axiomatic approach (later used by 
others including Luce and Raiffa, 1957) proves that a utility function for decisions 
under risk can be constructed from the preferred choices of the decision maker (Luce 
and Raiffa, 1957).  Barry and Robison (1987) summarize the four basic axioms of 
Von Nueman and Morgenstern’s theory: 
Ordering of choices: For any two choices  and  the decision  
maker either prefers to , prefers  to , or is indifferent. 
Transitivity of choices: If  is preferred to , and  is  
preferred to , then  must be preferred to . 
 Substitution of choices: If  is preferred to , and is some other  
choice, then a risky choice  + (1 − ) is preferred to another risky 
choice  + (1 − ), where  is the probability of occurrence of  or 
. 
 Certainty equivalent of choices: If  is preferred to , and  is 
preferred to , then some probability exists that the decision maker 
is indifferent to having  for certain or receiving  with probability  
and  with probability 1 − .  Thus  is the certainty equivalent of 
 + (1 − ) (Robison and Barry, 1987, p. 18). 
While an explicit utility function cannot be measured, the expected utility approach 
characterizes the nature of the decision environment (Robison and Barry, 1987).  It 
is these axioms which guide a grower’s decision to invest in food safety technology or 
not, to invest money in food safety training or not, or even to insure against a recall 
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event or to self-insure against such an event.  So that any policy prescription seeking 
to address food safety must conform not only to the grower’s acceptable expected 
value criteria, but must also maximize the expected utility of the risk.  That is, the 
investment decision to begin auditing firms (and what number of firms for that 
matter) and to insure against food safety scares does indeed lie on a continuum of 
choices and the extent to which one choice is preferred to another is characterized by 
the grower’s level risk aversion. While evaluating the preferences of growers in this 
manner is outside the scope of this thesis, it is no doubt necessary in understanding 
the logic of insurance as a risk response and the implications thereof. 
The Grower’s Insurance Decision 
A grower of produce can choose to insure against a recall event or not.  In 
equilibrium, the value of the choice to insure will equal the choice to not insure in 
the long run, but at any given point the grower faces the following decisions and 
states of nature (Robison and Barry, 1987, p. 214): 
States of Nature Probability Insurance No Insurance Recall p W+"# −π "# No Recall 1-p W+"# −π W+ "# 
Figure 1. Insurance Decisions and States of Nature 
 
where W represents the value of an asset susceptible to a recall event, "# represents 
the value of all assets not susceptible to a recall event, and & represents the 
premium paid for recall insurance, and p is the probability of the event (Robison and 
Barry, 1987). 3  Therefore, the expected value of insurance is equal to the value of 
                                               
3For simplicity, an asset susceptible to recall is referred to as a “risky” asset and 
assets not susceptible to recall are referred to as “riskless” or “safe” assets.  Even 
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the insured asset plus all non-insured assets, less the premium paid for the 
insurance.  The expected value of no insurance is the probability of a recall event 
times the value of non-risky assets plus the probability of no recall times the value of 
risky assets plus non-risky assets (Robison and Barry, 1987).  This is 
mathematically represented as follows: 
 
'(()*+,-)./) =  " + "# − & 
'(12 ()*+,-)./) =  ("#) + (1 − )( " + "#). 
(1) 
Simplifying and finding the difference between the two alternatives gives the 
actuarial difference.  That is, the expected value of insurance less the expected value 
of no insurance is equal to the probability of a recall event times the value of the 
risky asset less the premium: 
 '(()*+,-)./) −  '(12 ()*+,-)./) =  " − &. (2) 
While this represents the maximum that the grower will pay for product recall 
insurance, it does not represent the grower’s appetite for risk (Robison and Barry, 
1987).  A grower prefers a riskless asset that has a return equal to a risky asset.  
However, there exists a level of return on a risky asset (which is larger than that of 
the riskless asset) at which the grower is indifferent between the two alternatives 
because each provides the same level of utility (Robison and Barry, 1987).  This 
difference between the expected return on a risky asset and a safe asset is called the 
risk premium.   Subtracting the risk premium from the expected return of a risky 
asset gives the Certainty Equivalent (CE).  In the context of the recall insurance 
decision, both alternatives have a Certainty Equivalent expression as: 
                                                                                                                                            
though both are subject to many types of risk, this example is constrained to the 
insured risk. 
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 3' =  '("4) −  56729 :("4); (3) 
where, <=> :("4) represents the risk preferences of the grower multiplied by the 
variance of outcomes and the value of either alternative (i.e. no insurance or 
insurance).  This implies the risk premium increases as the risk associated with the 
alternative, :, increases and with the level of risk aversion, =, or both (Robison and 
Barry, 1987). 
The Insurer’s Risk Pool 
With an insurance contract, the insurer bears the risk of the insured event.  
While this means that the insurer experiences the same states of nature as the 
grower, the insurer benefits from economies of risk (Robison and Barry, 1987). 4  
Assuming that all risks underwritten by the insurer are independent and follow 
identical distributions, the insurer is able to average its expected losses from each 
firm, X, over the total number of growers, n, in the risk pool: 
 ' 6? + ? + ? … + ?A) 9 = ". (4) 
Like the individual grower, the expected value from a recall event is equal to the 
probability times the value of the risky asset (Robison and Barry, 1987).  However, 
the variability in outcomes is reduced due to economies of risk such that its certainty 
equivalent loss for which a premium would be required can be represented as: 
                                               
4 Economies of risk (or economies of scale with respect to risk) is a fundamental 
concept in risk pooling.  It refers to an insurance firm’s ability to decrease the 
variability of its returns as the size of the pool increases.  For further reading on this 
subject see Robison and Barry, 1987; Cummins, 1991; Harrington and Niehaus, 
2004.  
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 3'(-B/,-C/ D2**) =  '(") − E6729 F
:
) G (")H.    (5) 
Provided that the number of insured growers is greater than 2, this is less than the 
risk premium paid by the grower and thus the insurance arrangement is mutually 
beneficial (Robison and Barry, 1987).   
While the model in (4) assumes homogeneity in the types of risk and 
independence of one another, these are conditions that are desirable, but not 
required for an insurance pool (Cummins, 1991).  With positively correlated and 
heterogeneous risks, a pool can still be solvent, however the magnitude of risk 
reduction from pooling is lower than if the risks were independent (Harrington and 
Niehaus, 2004).   The relationship between the premium paid by a grower and the 
economies of risk enjoyed by the insurer allows any insurance to function as an 
effective risk management tool and minimize moral hazard.  In this way, insurance 
can be structured to fit the needs of growers of perishable commodities and provide 
incentive to create more food safety.  Currently, no industry has such a risk pool and 
insurance arrangement.  Policies addressing food safety on the market today are 
underwritten on an individual level by only a handful of insurers. 
Recall Expense Insurance 
 When dealing with the risk of a contamination in a grower’s produce, it is 
necessary to consider three principles; frequency, duration, and intensity (Turvey, 
2006).  Frequency reflects the probability that a contaminant is present in the 
grower’s produce while duration is the amount of time that the grower’s produce is 
infected by the contaminant.  Intensity is the degree of severity of the contaminant 
as a function of duration.  Contaminants that could affect a grower’s produce have 
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different durations, intensities and frequencies with some having a long duration 
and moderate losses, while others have very short durations and high losses 
(Turvey, 2006).  In the context of leafy green contaminants, in 2012 alone there were 
20 recalls of products for three different bacteria: Listeria monocytogenes, 
Salmonella, and E. coli. 
Figure 2. 2012 Contaminants Resulting in Recall of Leafy Greens 
 
From Figure 2, it is easy to see that not all recalls will be caused by the same 
contaminant and thus the costs associated with a given recall event will be different 
and random with respect to frequency, duration, and intensity of the contaminant.  
For example it is well understood that E. coli bacteria is more lethal than 
Salmonella and Listeria.  However, the Listeria outbreaks are more frequent, so 
they could present more of a risk in terms of hospitalizations.  The most recent 
spinach recalls (2011-2012) certainly reflect varying degrees of intensity (Table 1). 
  
63%
21%
16%
2012 Contaminants Resulting in Recall of Leafy Greens
Listeria monocytogenes
Salmonella
E. coli
16 
 
Table 1  
Description of Spinach Recalls (2011-2012) 
Date Brand Product Contaminant(s) 
Reported 
Illnesses 
Company 
4/6/2011 Fresh Express Spinach Salmonella 0 Fresh Express 
10/21/2011 
Church 
Brothers, LLC 
Bags of 
clipped 
spinach 
Salmonella 0 
Church 
Brothers, LLC 
10/24/2011 Fresh and Easy Spinach 
Listeria 
monocytogenes 
0 
Fresh & Easy 
Neighborhood 
Market Inc. 
12/23/2011 
Better Brand, 
Krisp Pak, Avon 
Heights 
Fresh 
Spinach 
E. coli 0 
Avon Heights 
Mushrooms, Inc. 
9/19/2012 
Kroger Fresh 
Selections 
Spinach 
Listeria 
monocytogenes 
0 Kroger 
11/2/2012 Wegmans Spinach E. coli 16 
Wegmans Foods 
Markets, Inc 
11/8/2012 Fresh Express Spinach Salmonella 0 
Fresh Express 
Incorporated 
 
The spinach recalls from 2011-2012 were largely initiated as precautionary 
measures and not in response to any reported illnesses.  Indeed, the only recall for 
which illnesses were reported was as a result of E. coli contamination which affected 
16 people, highlighting the severity of that particular bacterium. 
In a study released in 2013, the Center for Disease Control (CDC) found that 
of all the reported foodborne illnesses, contaminated leafy green commodities 
account for the highest proportion (22.3% of all foodborne illnesses).  However, in 
terms of hospitalizations and death, leafy greens rank #2 and #6 respectfully 
(Painter et al., 2013).  The rankings again highlight the heterogeneity and 
randomness associated with different contaminants and how they relate to the rates 
of illness, hospitalization, and death.  While leafy green commodities are the leading 
cause of foodborne illness, they rank lower than dairy products in terms of 
hospitalizations and lower than poultry in terms of deaths.   
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Turvey (2006) incorporates the concepts of frequency, intensity, and duration 
into a conceptual model of recall expense insurance designed to defray costs 
associated with business interruption, testing, and other recall-related expenses. 
This conceptual model provides a valuation of insurance for every $1000 of coverage 
purchased.  The model incorporates the duration of the recall event, with the 
probability of the duration assumed to be a gamma distribution with mean and 
standard deviation in terms of days.  The intensity of the recall event is represented 
by an exponential function, which is the duration raised to a given level of intensity 
so that the higher the intensity, the faster the value of the insurance is driven to 
zero (Turvey, 2006).  Because the frequency is a prior probability of the event 
occurring, underwriters can take a theoretical model such as this and adjust it for an 
individual firm. 
 The risk characterized by Turvey’s (2006) loss function in essence protects 
against the recall risk and serves as a theoretical model for recall insurance.  It 
demonstrates how frequency, intensity, and duration can be reflected in a contract 
to insure a producer against its own expenses.  Insurance policies which insure 
individual businesses against the expenses associated with recalls already exist, so 
it is quite possible for a grower to find coverage of this kind.  
While, insurance policies that cover expenses as a result of a recall do indeed 
exist, they are in their infancy.  Insurers have little experience with this form of risk 
and so premiums remain relatively high (Henkel, 2012).  The policies are innovative 
in that they are not liability coverage instruments, per se, in which the indemnity is 
only triggered after a consumer is injured.  Rather, the recall insurance policies on 
the market cover recall expenses, which can be substantial and ultimately lead to 
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financial distress.  This is an important distinction because recalls do not necessarily 
imply that there is an outbreak in the population.   In fact, many times recalls are 
initiated to prevent such outbreaks by stopping the consumption of the 
contaminated product, and this is indeed desirable.  Table 2 provides a visual 
summary of a sample of the policies on the market today.  Policies of this kind have 
been around in some form or another since 1993 (Skees et al., 2001), but have 
become more and more prevalent given the changing nature of the food industry and 
increased uncertainty.  Generalizations are drawn from Table 2, individual policies 
on the market, to inform a discussion of recall policies that exist today.
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Table 2:Product Recall Insurance Policies
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 With these policies, indemnities are triggered by the losses due to accidental 
or malicious tampering of a food product that either has resulted in or would result 
in bodily injury or property damage.  Malicious tampering is considered to be the 
intentional adulteration of the insured’s product such that there is reasonable cause 
to consider the product unsafe to consume.  Accidental contamination can be the 
result of bacterial contamination as well as chemical contamination caused by a 
variety of things including faulty manufacturing.  Human error can also be a 
covered recall event, where for example, an agent of the producer neglects to include 
an allergen warning on a product label and a recall is then needed.  Another way 
that a covered recall event can occur is through a presumed contamination of a food 
product.  Such a recall could occur as a result of product extortion, where a clear 
threat to maliciously tamper a food product is communicated to the company and a 
recall is then necessary.  This could also come about through regulatory forces where 
an outbreak of a disease is observed, but health officials cannot say with certainty 
the exact source. Under the Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA), the FDA can 
mandate a recall where a company has failed to voluntarily recall a food product.  
The law reads that a recall mandate can be implemented, “…based on information 
gathered through the reportable food registry … or through any other means, that 
there is a reasonable probability that an article of food … and the use of or exposure 
to such article will cause serious adverse health consequences or death to humans” 
(FSMA, 2011).  
 It should be noted, however, that there are mechanisms within the law that 
preclude this outcome.  The firm in question is first notified to cease distribution and 
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voluntarily recall the product.  Should the firm refuse to recall the product, the FDA 
first holds a hearing in which the firm can discuss the recall order.  The Secretary of 
Health and Human Services can then either amend or vacate the order after that 
point (FSMA, 2011).  Further, because of the substantial indirect costs of the product 
recall (that is, the damage to the brand and liability) it is far more likely that a firm 
will voluntarily recall a product before the FDA mandates a recall. 
The indemnities paid to the insured cover specific expenses associated with 
the recall and generally fall into three categories: pre-recall expense, recall expense, 
and third party expense.  Pre-recall expenses are those incurred in ascertaining the 
potential for bodily harm or property damage as a result of consumption of the 
product.  These include any type of chemical analysis or physical inspection of the 
product.  Recall expenses begin with notification that generally includes the cost of 
any form of announcement as well as the cost of correspondence with the customer 
and the public.  Within the firm, the recall insurance covers the expense of shipping 
the contaminated product and redistribution as well as additional 
warehousing/storage rent.  Insurance generally covers the hire of additional 
employees, overtime paid to employees, and expenses of the employees (such as 
transportation and lodging) as well.   Proper disposal of the product along with its 
packaging and, if need be, any unused packaging is also covered.  A key element of 
these policies is the third party costs.  Depending on the policy, these are the costs 
associated with the repair of a retailer’s product, business interruption, retail 
slotting fees, and any cancellation fees arising from a scheduled 
promotional/advertising campaign or any other expense that is contractually 
required with a retailer.  While many of the policies on the market today cover third-
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party costs, some offer it only as optional coverage where the insured must pay an 
additional premium (Henkel, 2012). 
Some policies offer loss of gross profit coverage.  This coverage can include 
losses from legal fees, net profits, and the replacement of contaminated product with 
non-contaminated product.  There can be a specified time frame for which the 
insured’s revenue is covered.  For example, Crum and Forster’s recallProtect+ policy 
can cover loss of profits over a span of 3, 6, 9, or 12 months after the covered 
incident. 
An important factor in food recall events in terms of cost is risk 
communication.  Particularly for those policies that indemnify the insured from loss 
of gross profit, risk communication is a key component in mitigating public outrage.  
The World Health Organization has recognized risk communication as an integral 
part of risk analysis in food safety and defines it as, “…an interactive process of 
exchange of information and opinion on risk among risk assessors, risk managers, 
and other interested parties” (World Health Organization, 2013).  Insurers have a 
vested interest in seeing that risk is communicated such that the insured company 
maintains its credibility in the eyes of the public and losses of revenue are mitigated.  
In the policies examined, many insurers that offer this coverage have partnered with 
public relations firms.  For example, Chartis’ RecallResponse policy highlights its 
relationship with Edelman, one of the world’s largest public relations firms, 
indicating that their strategic partnership during a crisis is essential to the future of 
the firm post-crisis.  Coverage of this kind is typically restricted to a specific time 
interval and offered as additional coverage (Henkel 2012). 
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Each policy has capacity limits for recall expenses that tend to be different 
based on the policy.  Chartis and Crum and Forster’s policies have capacities up to 
$10 million while Catlin’s policy has up to $25 million for accidental contamination 
and $50 million for malicious contamination.  Aon’s policy has a capacity up to $388 
million (includes liability coverage), however this capacity does not seem typical of 
most policies, which are generally designed for companies whose revenues are less 
than $1 Billion. 
While food product recall insurance is an effective risk management tool in 
mitigating the direct expenses of food recall events not otherwise covered in a 
liability insurance policy, again, these instruments are in their infancy.  The covered 
risks discussed in this paper are available; however, most policies only cover a few of 
the risks and also the deductible may be very high relative to the size of the firm 
(Henkel, 2012).  The question, then, is why a grower would not routinely purchase 
recall expense insurance?  A potential answer may be because insuring such an 
infrequent risk that is random in terms of duration and intensity does not maximize 
the grower’s utility for risk, and thus a grower may prefer to selfinsure.  Such a 
policy may, however, be more attractive to a large grower/shipper that contracts its 
production through individual growers. Because recalls are initiated at the brand 
level, an integrated grower/shipper’s risk associated with recall is different than that 
of an individual grower’s insofar as the costs associated with pulling a branded and 
packaged item from the market are likely to be higher than an individual grower’s.  
Further, this policy would only become active if the insured’s produce is recalled.  It 
would not, however, pay an indemnity in a situation where the market for the 
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insured’s produce is impaired or collapses as a result of another firm’s produce being 
contaminated. 
A grower may view the risk and the costs associated with a recall as 
something that can be monitored and managed within the firm through investments 
in information gathering (testing and auditing) and diversification (offering different 
products which are not correlated in terms of recall risk).  From Table 1, it is clear 
that many of the recalls are very small in scope, with only specific branded items 
being recalled and oftentimes initiated before any illnesses are reported.  A 
sufficiently large and diversified grower may be able to absorb the risk of any one 
commodity being recalled, provided the contaminant can be traced back effectively.   
Catastrophic Revenue Insurance  
 While growers may use existing policies or self-insurance to protect against 
the expenses associated with a recall, growers are still exposed to the systematic 
risk that a food safety scare can impair the market for a commodity for an unknown 
period of time.  Thus it may be equally, if not more important to insure against the 
systematic risk of a food safety scare.  Unlike insuring just the expenses, this risk 
would be highly correlated with other losses in an insurer’s portfolio of leafy green 
growers which is why a reinsurance arrangement similar to crop or flood insurance 
would likely be needed. 5   
Contingent claims valuation has been used in the literature to price 
agricultural insurance (Richards and Manfredo, 2003; Ramirez, Manfredo, Sanders, 
                                               
5 Reinsurance is insurance for an insurance pool.  A reinsurance arrangement allows 
the insurer to diversify risks without having to acquire more capital.  For further 
discussion, see Harrington and Niehaus, 2004, p. 89. 
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2006).  These works utilize options pricing models to value revenue insurance for 
farmers in specialty crops and are particularly informative in creating such an 
instrument. 
 An insurance contract for revenue whose payoff is contingent upon a food 
scare is isomorphic to a put option. A put option is a financial instrument whose 
holder pays a premium to have the right, but not the obligation to sell an underlying 
asset at a specified price (the strike price).  In adapting this to a revenue insurance 
model, the “price” of the underlying is the revenue at a particular week for the 
spinach industry.  Thus, a catastrophic revenue insurance policy which indemnifies 
growers for revenue losses resulting from a food safety scare can be adapted from 
the conceptual model of a vanilla put option:  
 IJ = K(L) M N(OP)
Q
#
(R − OP)SOP (6) 
where K(L) is the discount factor, /TUP, where r is the risk-free rate of interest, and R 
is the cut-off revenue level (or, in the context of a put option, the strike price).  The 
revenue, OP, triggers an indemnity in the amount of the difference between cut-off 
revenue, R, and the revenue at maturity, OP.  This would mean that the insured 
purchases a policy that matures at the end of the year.  At the end of the year, if 
revenue is below the strike price, a payment in the amount of the difference is paid 
from the insurer.  Such a policy offers the insured flexibility in that any combination 
of unfavorable prices and volume can trigger an indemnity.  
 The major shortcoming with the vanilla put option model is that its payoff 
depends on the magnitude of the underlying asset value and its strike at maturity.  
Thus, such an option may not be triggered if, at the time of maturity, prices and 
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volumes of the commodity have recovered from an outbreak event.  Having the 
option to receive a payout whose value takes into account the effect of the event at 
maturity would indeed be more appropriate.   Following Turvey’s (2006) work, this 
thesis examines a class of exotic options known as path-dependent options.  As the 
name implies, these options are designed to capture how the settlement prices of the 
underlying asset were reached (Zhang, 1998).  There are three types of path-
dependent options that are appropriate for consideration in the context of 
catastrophic revenue insurance: Asian options, lookback options, and barrier 
options. 
 An Asian option is an option whose value is derived from an average of 
underlying revenues over a given period of time (Zhang, 1998).  In effect, an Asian 
option is the equivalent of buying multiple vanilla options, but is much cheaper as it 
reflects an average of each vanilla option purchased (Zhang, 1998).  The value of the 
option is an average taken over time based on the expected realization of a constant 
strike less the average underlying revenue:  
 (/TUP)'VW-XY0, (R − OP\\\)]^ (7) 
such that should the average revenue over the specified period of time, OP\\\, fall below 
the strike, K, an indemnity is triggered in the amount of the difference between K 
and OP\\\ (Glasserman, 2004).  Because the option is triggered by circumstances which 
drive the average revenue below the strike, this option is the most practical for 
catastrophic revenue purposes and offers good coverage to the insured.  It is limited, 
however, by the fact that should prices and volume rebound in subsequent weeks, 
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the option still may not be triggered yet the grower may have still been impacted by 
the event. 
 As opposed to an Asian option, a lookback put option captures the extremes of 
revenue movements by allowing the policy holder to receive a payout based on the 
minimum revenue observed over the life of the option, not the average (Zhang, 
1998).  In this way, the lookback option is identical to the vanilla put option in (6), 
except that the underlying revenue at maturity is replaced by the lowest price 
observed over the life of the option thus giving the holder of the option the maximum 
possible payout (Zhang, 1998).  So that the payoff at expiration of the option is: 
 (/TUP)'VW-XV(R) − _`)(OP4)^. (8) 
Where _`)(OP4) is the minimum observed revenue over the life of the option.  The 
major limitation of this is that because it is based upon the highest valued 
occurrence (i.e. the lowest revenue), the premium will be significantly higher than 
the Asian option (Turvey, 2006).  Although the premium will be higher, this option 
may be useful in that it offers the most coverage of all the options examined. 
 Barrier options are another form of path-dependent options that may be 
effective in structuring revenue insurance.  These options only become active if the 
underlying asset’s value reaches a certain level (Hull, 2000).  In the context of the 
revenue insurance arrangements examined in this thesis, the “knock-in” barrier put 
option is the most appropriate.  This is simply a vanilla put option that only becomes 
active if the revenue at expiration, OPA, falls below the barrier, a(K),  
 (/TUP)'V1Ya(K) ≤ LA](OPA − R)^.    (9) 
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Barrier options are attractive because they limit exposure to time value (Turvey, 
2006).  The reason for this is that barrier options have the same value as any option, 
when active, but no value when not active (Turvey, 2006).  Their value, then, is 
based upon two probabilities: the probability that the barrier will be reached and the 
probability that an indemnity is triggered.  These options offer some flexibility with 
respect to the risk preferences of the grower insofar as the barrier option can be 
combined with an Asian or a lookback.  
In the context of spinach revenue insurance, the barrier at which the put 
option becomes active would likely be a recall event rather than some circumstance 
of prices or quantities.  This barrier event could coincide with a systematic market 
effect or not.  In the case of the 2006 E. coli outbreak in spinach, however, the exact 
source was not identified until an entire month later at which point DNA analysis 
confirmed that four fields in San Juan Bautista, CA were the only source of the 
outbreak.  By this time the entire market had basically come to a stand still for two 
weeks, leaving growers without a market for their spinach for that amount of time.   
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METHODOLOGY  
Options Pricing with Monte Carlo Methods 
In their seminal work Black and Scholes (1973) provide a closed form solution 
for the pricing of options as a function of 5 factors: (1) the underlying cash market 
price, (2) the option strike price, (3) the time to maturity, (4) the risk-free rate of 
return, and (5) the volatility of returns from the underlying asset (Black and 
Scholes, 1973; Zhang, 1998).  This equilibrium based pricing model assumes that 
stock prices follow a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM), with settlement prices 
distributed log-normally and returns distributed normally (Hull, 2000).  The Black 
Scholes model and its assumptions have served as the traditional way to price 
options.   
The Black-Scholes model provides a closed form solution to estimating the 
theoretical value of a European style option, but it cannot be used to conveniently 
value path dependent options in the context of revenue insurance for fresh spinach.  
Monte Carlo simulation methods, however, provide a convenient and flexible way to 
estimate the value of path-dependent options. 6  Monte Carlo methods for pricing 
options were first presented by Boyle (1977).  In contrast to the closed-form 
approach, Monte Carlo methods offer particular flexibility in application 
(Glasserman, 2004).  Essentially, the Monte Carlo approach generates large 
numbers of random movements in the underlying asset’s price from which the option 
price is ultimately derived.  The advantage of this is that the distribution from 
which the options prices are drawn is specified with relative ease.  Further, this is 
                                               
6 Hull, 2000 shows a closed form solution for path-dependents. 
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particularly useful for analyzing path-dependent options where the underlying 
process can contain jumps or revert to a mean. 
 There are 5 basic steps to obtain options prices using Monte Carlo 
simulation: (1) a sample path is obtained from the risk-neutral world, (2) the payoff 
is calculated, (3) sample paths are repeatedly taken and payoffs calculated, (4) the 
mean of the sample payoffs is calculated in order to obtain the expected value of the 
payoff, and (5) the expected value of the payoff is discounted at the risk-free rate of 
interest (Hull, 2000).  In the context of revenue insurance, the changes in revenue 
are specified and added to the revenue from week to week.  A payoff is calculated 
based on whether or not a payoff is triggered.  This is simulated 5000 times for 
robustness, so that the average payoff is the expected value of the option over many, 
many weeks. 7   
An important aspect of pricing these policies is the setting of the strike 
revenue.  In order to accommodate many scenarios, the strike is first set at the long-
term average weekly revenue then increased to show the effect of moving the strike 
upward.  With the “knock in” barrier options, the strike revenue is allowed to vary 
according to the average weekly revenue at the time the barrier is crossed.   
As discussed in the previous section, the barrier is defined as a recall event in 
the spinach industry.  While the 2006 E. coli outbreak and subsequent recall was the 
largest one in the history of the leafy green industry, not all recalls have a noticeable 
effect on prices or volumes.  In fact, of the seven most recent spinach recalls, none 
had any clear impact on the market for fresh spinach.  Figure 3 shows prices and 
volumes of spinach with all the spinach recalls highlighted from 2011-2012.   
                                               
7 For a full example of how to model in a spreadsheet framework see Appendix B. 
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Figure 3. Spinach Prices and Volume with Recalls (2011-2
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Because no clear correlation between these particular recall events and 
systematic effects can be seen, the intensity and duration of each event play a large 
role in whether or not there is a market decline in the industry.  Because very few 
recalls have a severe systematic impact, this frequency is much lower than the recall 
event, but corresponds to a 79.1% decline in revenues as calculated by Richards et 
al. (2009).   The overall probability of such an event occurring is mathematically 
represented as follows: 
 
19 ,/.-DD*
427 f//g* ∗
1 2+LK,/-g
19 ,/.-DD* ≈ .0023  (10) 
This implies that a recall with an outbreak on the magnitude of the 2006 case occurs 
1 time out of every 427 weeks.  The barrier options, then, reflect the probability of a 
recall initiated in any given week with a probability of 19/427.  The outbreak with a 
demand shock (or jump) is given a probability of 1/19, provided a recall has been 
initiated.  
In using Monte Carlo methods in estimating the value of the insurance 
contracts (options) described above, spinach industry revenue is assumed to follow a 
Brownian motion process (Richards et al., 2009):   
 SOP = kSL + :Sl  (11) 
where k represents the mean drift rate of the process for each unit of time, dt.  The 
volatility of the process is represented by : and dz represents the standard Weiner 
process (Hull, 2000; Glasserman, 2004; Richards et al. 2009).  This model is 
simplistic, however, in that allows the revenue to evolve in either direction (negative 
or positive) without bound.  Because this is not a reasonable assumption for 
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commodities, the model is adjusted so that any trends away from the mean revert 
back toward the mean in the long run (Richards et al., 2009).  This is represented by 
adjusting the process in (11) as follows: 
 SOP = g(OPm − OP)SL + :Sl  (12) 
where k is the rate at which the price reverts back to the mean and OPm is the mean 
revenue (Richards et al., 2009).  This model is used to characterize changes in 
revenue for the spinach industry every week. 
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DATA 
 A time series of weekly spinach revenue from 2005 to 2013 was developed 
from reported USDA – AMS prices and volumes.  The prices represent an average of 
the high and the low per carton price of bulk spinach in California and Arizona for 
each week. 8  The total volume of cartons represents all shipments from Arizona and 
California in order to stay consistent with the pricing data.  All values are observed 
at the shipping point of the spinach, meaning the prices and volume of cartons 
reflects the point at which the product first changed hands.  While spinach is grown 
and shipped from other places, California and Arizona represent the bulk of 
shipments and is recorded regularly by the AMS, which does not count the number 
of cartons from Mexico.  The time series encompasses the effect of the E. coli 
outbreak in US spinach at which point the data shows no movement of spinach 
between September 23, 2006 and September 30, 2006, and notes that on the day of 
the outbreak that, “Supplies insufficient to quote.”9    
Revenue is calculated by multiplying the average of each week’s price by that 
week’s entire volume of cartons.  This is the total revenue of the entire fresh bulk 
spinach industry.  Because there are no values recorded for the two weeks ending on 
September 23rd and September 30th industry revenue is assumed to be zero which is 
consistent with the AMS reporting.  Figure 4 is a chart of the revenue data.  
                                               
8 Bulk spinach are boxes containing 24 bunches of spinach.  Note that the data do 
not reflect bagged spinach values. 
9 Source: USDA-AMS Market News Portal: http://1.usa.gov/WZWOWR 
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Figure 4. Weekly Revenue: CA and AZ Spinach (2005-2013) 
 
Figure 4 not only highlights how volatile weekly spinach revenues are, but also the 
seasonality of the spinach production.  Spinach is produced year round in the coastal 
areas of California.  However, from December through March the industry produces 
much higher volumes as production areas in Imperial Valley, California and Arizona 
add to the amount of spinach coming from the coastal regions.  For this reason, 
upward spikes in revenue are primarily driven by increases in the volume. On a 
yearly basis, revenue of fresh bunched spinach has shown large increases over time 
as seen in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. Annual Spinach Revenue (2005-2012) 
As shown in Figures 4 and 5, revenues from spinach, though highly volatile, have 
grown tremendously from $31 million in 2005 to $98 million in 2012.  Despite the 
outbreak in 2006, total industry revenue still grew relative to 2005 to about $34 
Million.  In the next section, the pattern of this growth in revenue is fitted and 
option values are estimated. 
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RESULTS 
Stochastic Process Estimation 
In order to estimate the price of the spinach insurance policies outlined 
previously, the nature of the revenues is first characterized.  By fitting a stochastic 
process to the weekly revenue data for spinach and estimating the structure of the 
process, values for the exotic options discussed can then be calculated from a 
simulated forecast.  The processes fitted are a Brownian Motion and a Brownian 
Motion with Mean Reversion as is consistent with the literature (Richards et al., 
2009).  While Richards et al. (2009) explicitly fit a jump process to spinach revenue, 
for the purposes of testing a variety of options, this thesis follows the treatment of 
jump processes put forth by Turvey (2006). Jumps are indeed important to the 
process of the underlying, however in terms of catastrophic market collapses (which 
the proposed insurance is designed for) a jump is modeled outside of the process 
itself using prior probabilities and reflected in the barrier options as suggested by 
Turvey (2006).  The parameters of the BM process (11) and BM-MR process (12) as 
well as the overall fit of both processes were estimated using SHAZAM Econometrics 
Software and are presented in Table 3. 
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Table 3  
 
Stochastic Process for Spinach Industry Revenue: January 2005-March 2013 
Process:   BM BM-MR 
Variable Definition Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio 
µ Average growth rate 0.009 0.272 0.009 0.287 
σ Standard deviation of the process 0.399* 29.177 0.373* 30.751 
κ Rate of mean reversion N/A 0.124* 5.530 
Log-Likelihood function -406.684 -392.789 
*Significant at the 5% level.  The processes are estimated via maximum likelihood. 
As shown in Table 3, the BM-MR process is the preferred model and indicates that 
revenues in spinach have increased by 0.9% on average.  The rate of mean reversion 
is estimated at about 12% per week meaning that any upward or downward 
deviations from the mean are fully removed about every 9 weeks. 10 
Vanilla, Asian, Lookback, and Barrier Option Premiums 
The estimated parameters for the BM-MR process are used with (12) to 
simulate the path of weekly spinach revenue over a 52 week period using Monte 
Carlo methods.  This is facilitated using Pallisade’s @RISK software (see Appendix 
B).  Premiums of the various options are calculated by taking the average realization 
of each payoff (outlined previously) and then discounting the payoffs at the current 
risk-free rate of interest, 0.25%.11  The strike price for each fixed strike option is 
simply the average weekly revenue over all the weeks in the data which is 
                                               
10 The maximum-likelihood function as well as the SHAZAM code were provided by 
Dr. Timothy Richards.  To see the maximum-likelihood equation, please see 
Richards et al, 2009. 
11 This rate is consistent with the Federal Reserve’s target for the federal funds rate.  
However, at the time of this thesis the actual Federal Funds Rate was less than the 
target (approximately 0.15%).  Consistent with option pricing theory, the risk-free 
rate of interest has a relatively low impact on option prices. 
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approximately $1.25 million.  In the variable strike scheme, the strike price is 
established by taking the weekly average at the point the option is invoked.  Under 
the barrier scheme the option is activated (or “knocked in”) any time there is a recall 
announcement in spinach.  The frequency is taken from a count of all recalls 
occurring within the time horizon of the revenue data as calculated in (10).   
Table 4 shows the various options values at increasing strike revenues 
starting at the long-term weekly average of $1.25 million. 
Table 4 
Fixed Strike Option Values 
Strike Price 
Option Value 
Vanilla Asian Lookback 
$1,250,000 $284,742 $133,647 $1,080,425 
$1,500,000 $425,254 $285,678 $1,326,802 
$2,000,000 $817,298 $739,065 $1,829,987 
$3,000,000 $1,734,421 $1,729,415 $2,825,206 
     
The results in Table 4 show that the price of the insurance increases with the 
amount of revenue covered.  As expected, with a strike of $1,250,000, the Asian 
option is the least expensive at $133,647 and the lookback is the most expensive at 
$1,080,425.  The vanilla option, priced at $284,742, is lower than the lookback, but 
higher than the Asian.  This is because it reflects the probability that the weekly 
revenue will be below the strike at maturity while the lookback reflects the worst 
observed weekly revenue.  Increasing the strike price has a very noticeable effect on 
the option values, increasing them considerably.  This is because the higher the 
strike, the more likely it is that a payout will be triggered.  While the price of 
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insurance seem high at a strike of $3 million, this may be a reasonable premium if 
industry revenues reach a level where insuring that amount of coverage would be 
needed.   
Table 5 
Option Values for Barrier Schemes 
Option Scheme 
Option Value 
Vanilla Asian Lookback 
Barrier with Fixed Strike ($1.25 Million) $262,234 $117,019 $974,541 
Barrier with Variable Strike  $308,290 $129,175 $987,253 
Barrier with Variable Strike and Jump $305,120 $129,766 $987,496 
 
Adding the barrier with a frequency of 19/427, in each case reduced the value.  
Again the Asian option is the cheapest at $117,019 followed by the vanilla and the 
lookback at $262,234 and $974,541 respectively.   These options are cheaper relative 
to the non-barrier options because the barrier must be reached first before a payout 
can be considered, regardless of revenue movements.   
Allowing the strike price to vary with respect to the weekly average at the 
point of time the barrier is crossed makes the option more expensive.  Again, the 
Asian option is the least expensive at $129,175 followed by the vanilla option at 
$308,290, and the lookback at $987,253.  While these options are less expensive than 
the fixed strike options with no barrier, they are more expensive than the fixed 
strike barrier options.  This is because it allows the strike price to grow with the 
process.  The mean strike during the simulation is about $1.25 million, the standard 
deviation is $441.6 thousand, and the maximum strike observed was $2.79 million. 
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Allowing revenue to be reduced according to the prior probabilities in (10) 
does not alter the option value by a meaningful amount (relative to the fixed strike 
barrier), but does increase the Asian to $129,766 and the lookback to $987,456 
reflecting the fact that the probability of a massive market decline is very small, but 
does increase the option value in that it is more likely that the option will be 
triggered with the reduction. Because the vanilla option reflects the probability of a 
payout at maturity and does not take into account the path of revenue over the life 
of the option, adding the shock to the barrier reduces the option value, but only to 
$305,120.  For a full description of the estimation procedure see Appendix B. 
 In order to get a sense of perspective as to the cost of such insurance to 
growers, it is informative to compare the estimated premiums to the current handler 
assessment rates on a per-carton basis.  Because revenues have historically been 
driven by large increases in volume, it is necessary to consider the amount of 
spinach produced over time before gauging the per-carton cost. 
42 
 
 
Figure 6. Annual Spinach Volume (2005-2012) 
As shown in Figure 6, the volume of cartons has been increasing with 2012 having 
the largest carton total over the series with about 9.3 million cartons shipped.   
Using the average of 5,375,804 cartons over this time period results in a 
conservative estimate of the grower cost per carton under each revenue insurance 
scheme. 
Table 6 
Per Carton Cost of Insurance 
Option Scheme 
Per Carton Cost 
Vanilla Asian Lookback 
Fixed Strike ($1.25 million) $0.053  $0.025  $0.201  
Barrier with Fixed Strike (1.25 million) $0.049  $0.022  $0.181  
Barrier with Variable Strike  $0.057  $0.024  $0.184  
Barrier with Variable Strike and Jump $0.057  $0.024  $0.184  
*Based on average annual volume of spinach produced from 2005-2012. 
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The results in Table 6 indicate that the Asian option values are indeed the 
most affordable insurance policies at about $0.02 to $0.025 per carton while the 
lookback would cost about $0.18 to $0.20 depending on the scheme.  The vanilla 
option is priced between 4 to 6 cents depending on the scheme.  However, the vanilla 
put option is probably the least appropriate for insurance purposes. 
Given that all current AZ/CALGMA signatory producers and handlers pay 
around $0.02 per box, a comparable insurance premium perhaps indicates that 
growers would be willing to pay around this price to avoid the negative impacts of a 
food scare.  Further, these option values are comparable to the program estimates 
for the proposed NLGMA which are between $0.01 and $0.05 in per-carton 
assessments to signatory handlers with additional assessments as determined by 
the board of the marketing agreement (USDA-AMS, 2011).  Because the insurance 
premiums estimated represent the cost of only spinach revenue insurance (a 
commodity which makes up only 7% of all leafy green production), the price of the 
insurance on a per-carton basis may decrease if the insurance were made to cover all 
the other items under the leafy green marketing agreement.  This, however, must be 
empirically tested. 
 Although much research is needed to operationalize such an insurance policy, 
it is no less informative to consider the per carton cost of the insurance in the 
context of a spinach growing operation. Using a University of Arizona Cost Study for 
a one acre spinach farm in Maricopa County (2001), a sample cost/return summary 
is assembled (Table 7). 
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Table 7 
Total Cash Costs and Returns of AZ Spinach Farm (One Acre, Maricopa County)12 
 
Budgeted Income (494 Cartons @ $14.18) $7,004.92 
Cash Land Prep & Growing Expenses 705.39 
 Cash Harvest & Post Harvest Expenses 2311.14 
 Operating Overhead 7.63 
 Operating Interest (10%) 9.83 
 Total Cash Operating Expenses 3033.99 
 Cash Overhead Expenses 250.69 
 Land Cost/Rent or Lease 200.00 
 Water Assessment 10.14 
 Total Ownership Costs 460.83 
 Total Cost 3494.82 
 Net Returns   $3,510.10 
Break Even Price @ 494 Cartons 
 
$707 
Break Even Quantity @ $14.18 
 
246.46 
 
The cost study budgets for an average yield of 494 cartons and an average price of 
$14.18.  At a per carton cost of $0.025 per carton for the insurance policy priced as 
an Asian option, and $0.184 per carton for insurance policy priced as a lookback, this 
brings the total expense for insurance to $12.35 and $90.90  respectively under the 
budgeted yield.  Adding the proposed insurance expense will increase the break-even 
point of the operation. 
  
                                               
12 Source: 
http://cals.arizona.edu/arec/pubs/vegetablecrops/central/20012002/cspinach2001.pdf 
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Table 8 
Total Cash Costs of One Acre AZ Spinach Farm w/Revenue Insurance (Asian 
Option) 
Budgeted Income (494 Cartons @ $14.18)   $7,004.92 
Cash Land Prep & Growing Expenses 705.39 
 Cash Harvest & Post Harvest Expenses 2311.14 
 Operating Overhead 7.63 
 Operating Interest (10%) 9.83 
 Total Cash Operating Expenses 3033.99 
 Cash Overhead Expenses 250.69 
 Land Cost/Rent or Lease 200.00 
 Revenue Insurance ($0.025/Carton) 12.35 
 Water Assessment 10.14 
 Total Ownership Costs 473.18 
 Total Cost 3507.17 
 Net Returns   $3,497.75 
Break-Even Price @ 494 Cartons 
 
7.10 
Break-Even Quantity @ $14.18 
 
247.33 
 
 Adding the insurance for the Asian option scheme increases the minimum 
price and quantity that the farm needs to operate.  The break-even price at the 
budgeted yield increases by three cents to $7.10 while the break-even quantity 
increases by one carton. 
 Under the lookback scheme, the insurance has a much more meaningful 
impact on the farm’s expenses and thus the minimum price and quantity needed to 
operate.  Table 9 shows the impact of that a particular coverage. 
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Table 9 
Total Cash Costs of One Acre AZ Spinach Farm w/Revenue Insurance (lookback 
option) 
 
Budgeted Income (494 Cartons @ $14.18)   $7,004.92 
Cash Land Prep & Growing Expenses 705.39 
 Cash Harvest & Post Harvest Expenses 2311.14 
 Operating Overhead 7.63 
 Operating Interest (10%) 9.83 
 Total Cash Operating Expenses 3033.99 
 Cash Overhead Expenses 250.69 
 Land Cost/Rent or Lease 200.00 
 Revenue Insurance ($0.184/Carton) 90.90 
 Water Assessment 10.14 
 Total Ownership Costs 551.726 
 Total Cost 3585.72 
 Net Returns   $3,419.20 
Break Even Price @ 494 Cartons 
 
7.26 
Break Even Quantity @ $14.18 
 
252.87 
  
The total cost of the insurance to the farm is about $90.90 per acre for its 
budgeted production of 494 cartons.  Relative to the cost of the Asian option scheme, 
this is more expensive, but still, the minimum break-even point is moved up only 
slightly; by about $0.16 for the break-even price at the budgeted quantity and about 
five cartons for the break-even quantity a the budgeted price.  This shows that under 
normal circumstances, the cost of such an insurance product for a one acre farm is 
not unreasonable, though further research is needed to operationalize the policy.  
For example, the insurance priced in this thesis assumes coverage on 100% of 
average weekly revenues.  Farmers may indeed prefer a lower level of coverage 
which would further decrease the cost of insurance, yet still protect the grower’s 
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revenue at some level in the face of a food safety scare that negatively impacts 
market prices and volume of trade.  
An important concept to remember when discussing revenue insurance as a 
tool in agribusiness risk management is that an operation should not make money 
from any revenue insurance policy.  Rather, the insurance should protect revenue in 
the face of an extreme event that reduces revenue to levels that would invoke 
considerable financial losses in the face of an event like a food safety scare.  A naïve 
example illustrates this concept.  Assume a spinach grower purchased an insurance 
policy to cover 100% of his or her budgeted revenue (e.g.,  $7,004.92 per acre such as 
the case of the above representative spinach farm).    An indemnity will be triggered 
if a recall occurs and the market for the grower’s spinach is impaired, such that 
revenues are below the indemnified amount.  If the market collapse results in a 
79.1% decrease in industry-wide revenues (as seen in the 2006 outbreak in spinach), 
this would mean that the grower would likely realize similar losses, thus only take 
in $1,464.03 (79.1% of $7,004.92), far less than the $3,585.72 needed to break-even.  
The indemnity to bring the farm back up to the budgeted amount of $7,004.92 would 
be a payment of $5,540.89.  This would bring the farm revenues back to normal 
levels after the food safety scare.  13While the insurance policy would indeed be a 
valuable tool to the grower during a food safety crisis, historically, these events are 
                                               
13 Again, it is important to remember that this is a very simple example used to 
demonstrate the concept of how revenue insurance can be used for risk management 
purposes.  Thus the exact indemnity amount would be a function of the coverage 
level, as well as the difference between the pre-determined strike revenue and the 
average revenue over a given time period consistent with an Asian option (or the 
difference between the strike revenue and minimum revenue over a given time 
period in the case of a lookback option).   
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rare.  Thus the $12.35 expense year-after-year may seem unwarranted, particularly 
with the volatility of revenues the spinach industry experiences normally.  However, 
in the presence of a severe food safety scare, the policy would allow the grower to 
maintain revenue at or above break-even levels.  In many cases, this may be the 
difference between the operation staying in business, or closing down for good.    In 
the long-run then, this risk management tool could serve to keep many growers in 
business, particularly smaller, less capitalized growers such as the one described in 
the Arizona Spinach enterprise budget presented above 
It is important to note that these estimates do not represent the cost of 
actually running and administering such an insurance pool, which could be 
substantial.  While the true cost of insurance would indeed reflect this, the purpose 
of this thesis is to examine the feasibility of insuring the risk and to estimate 
actuarially fair premiums, thus any estimation as to the administrative cost of the 
pool itself is outside the scope of this thesis.  It is likely, however, that a market can 
be found for such a risk either through large private reinsurers or through the 
government, specifically, the USDA Risk Management Agency (RMA) that pilots 
such products.  The risk would be very attractive to reinsurers because it is a large, 
economically significant risk that is uncorrelated with other risks such as natural 
disasters.  Further, the risk is already being monitored by government officials 
through the AZ/CALGMA.  Perhaps most importantly, the risk of an outbreak in 
leafy greens will likely decrease over time as trace-back and food safety technology 
improves.  If indeed reinsurance arrangements can be achieved, the total cost of 
running such a pool would be shared with reinsurers. 
  
49 
 
CONCLUSION 
Summary 
 The risk of a foodborne pathogen presents producers with significant 
economic challenges.  Though the safety of food provided to consumers lies squarely 
on the shoulders of each individual producer, should any one producer deviate from 
that responsibility, the livelihood of all others are at stake.  Nowhere is this more 
prevalent than in the leafy green industry.  Contaminated leafy green items have 
resulted in more foodborne illnesses than any other food item.  Additionally, the 
industry has been rocked by one massive E. coli outbreak in spinach which resulted 
in three deaths and over 200 reported illnesses, not to mention the considerable 
damage done to consumer confidence thereafter. 
 In order to prevent such events from happening, growers and handlers have 
come together in the two states where nearly all leafy greens are grown; California 
and Arizona.  These growers and handlers have formed two statewide food safety 
initiatives in the form of marketing agreements which assess a per carton check-off 
to administer and enforce food safety standards put forth in either agreement.  
However, recalls still occur and thus the risk of an outbreak is still present. 
 Current insurance policies offer food companies excellent coverage for just 
about any expense incurred as a result of a recall.  These policies are indeed 
innovative and offer clear incentives to growers who purchase such policies to lower 
their premium by investing in food safety.  These, however, are limited in that they 
are not required by all producers and handlers and address the risk on purely a firm 
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level.  Insurance addressing the systematic risk of market collapse may be just as 
important, if not more important to insure than the pure expense of a recall event.  
Using spinach industry revenue, a contingent claims approach to pricing 
weekly revenue insurance was implemented to estimate the value of a variety of 
different payout schemes.  In doing this, a stochastic process for weekly changes in 
spinach revenue was fitted to estimate a 52 week forecast.  This was simulated and 
priced using Monte Carlo methods.  Consistent with the literature, this thesis draws 
on the use of path dependent options to price insurance.  In particular, Asian, 
barrier, and lookback options were estimated and compared to current check-off 
prices.  The Asian option insurance scheme is the cheapest between $0.02 and 
$0.025 per carton, while the lookback is the most expensive between $0.18 and $0.20 
cents per carton.  Adding a barrier based on the probability of a recall decreases the 
option value, while allowing the strike to vary according to an average of the weekly 
revenue at the point the barrier is reached makes it more expensive.   Overall, the 
results compare favorably to current check-off amounts which are between $0.01 and 
$0.05 per carton.  The cost of this insurance was evaluated at the farm level to show 
that it is of marginal impact to a small representative spinach growing operation. 
Implications 
Though the goal of this research is to present a model for catastrophic 
revenue insurance, such an arrangement undoubtedly warrants a discussion of 
moral hazard.  That is, if the risk of a market collapse is mitigated through 
insurance, what incentive does any grower have to prevent such a situation?  To 
some extent, this is seen in flood insurance where people who build houses on known 
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flood plains are able to purchase subsidized flood insurance for their homes.  This 
arrangement creates problems in that it allows homeowners to build in risky 
locations.  In the context of food safety, this is a situation that is completely at odds 
with any food safety initiative or policy. 
 The question of how moral hazard can be mitigated is one that is inherent in 
any insurance arrangement and naturally requires a mechanism of monitoring and 
information sharing.  Turvey, et al. (2002) study moral hazard among agricultural 
producers and simulate the use of inputs under an insurance contract.  They find 
that ex-ante regulation of farmers induces the use of more inputs as it changes the 
optimizing behavior of the farmer (Turvey et al., 2002).  For this reason, any 
insurance in food safety would likely come with prescribed regulations mandating 
Good Agricultural Practices, Good Manufacturing Practices, as well as other 
industry standards.  Because such regulations are in place and monitored through 
marketing agreements, the model for insurance presented in this thesis would likely 
function best through a marketing agreement such as the AZ/CALGMA.   
Members of these California and Arizona marketing agreements have (along 
with other produce industry associations) advocated for a national marketing 
agreement seeking to further unify food safety standards in the industry, giving rise 
to the proposal for the NLGMA.  Despite this effort to prevent outbreaks, opponents 
to the proposed agreement argue that the cost of compliance to small farmers are too 
high, and further, that such outbreak events, as well as the numerous recall events 
each year, emanate from large producers of pre-cut, bagged products.  For this 
reason, the national marketing agreement put forth by the USDA has been criticized 
for charging small farmers for a risk largely caused by large manufacturers.  
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Whether the risk of an outbreak lies with manufacturers or farmers is the subject 
for another study, but in either case small farmers of leafy greens certainly benefit 
from the bagged salad industry which has greatly expanded the market for leafy 
greens.  The risk of an outbreak from either end of the supply chain is indeed 
related, and the chief benefit of the marketing agreement to growers is the reduced 
probability of such events occurring.  
As such agreements are voluntary, the insurance model presented could 
provide a way to expand membership and add value to signatory members, 
particularly to small farmers.  If the check-off assessment required by signatory 
growers included an insurance premium, it is possible that small farmers and other 
handlers would be more likely to join the agreement as their participation would 
prevent them from ever being completely wiped out from a food safety-scare.  This is 
important because participation in such an agreement across all firms is not only 
desirable going forward, but also necessary to mitigate the problem of free riders.  
 Further, given the infrequent nature of such a risk, it is likely that insurance 
claims will not be triggered and thus the pool will be profitable.  Any surplus of 
funds from the insurance arrangement may be used by the marketing agreement to 
fund activities such as research, promotion, and advertising.  In the proposal for the 
NLGMA, special provisions are made so that the board of the proposed national 
agreement may initiate a supplemental rate in addition to the normal assessment 
rate to address a specific problem, however, in total this cannot exceed $0.05 per 
carton.  Funds from an insurance arrangement may offer some flexibility with 
regard to special projects as the need occurs.  
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Future Research 
 From a theoretical standpoint, the insurance arrangement in this thesis 
makes very logical sense, however it gives rise to many questions.  First, is there 
any proof that insurance can improve food safety?  This would likely require a 
careful empirical examination of companies that have recall insurance vs. those that 
do not.  Secondly, is it really true that farmers would be more likely to participate in 
a marketing agreement with such an insurance arrangement embedded into the 
check-off price?  Interestingly, current crop insurance policies for leafy greens have 
some of the lowest participation rates of any crop insurance program, suggesting 
that perhaps growers will not be willing to pay for insurance.  It would be valuable 
to survey current and potential members of marketing agreements to see if this 
would be the case.  Finally, is the current arrangement of marketing orders effective 
such that it does not warrant further modification?  This is perhaps the most 
important area for future research and one that would be most valuable to industry 
players.  If current marketing agreements are found deficient in some way, the 
appropriate solution may or may not be an insurance program such as the model 
presented in this thesis.  
 Relative to further research in pricing food safety insurance, the first area to 
expand research would be to price such insurance using American-style options.  
This would give the insured the right to collect a payout at the week in which the 
food safety event occurred as opposed to the European-style options presented in 
this thesis, which pay out only at maturity.  Further, it would be insightful to know 
the impact of insuring multiple commodities using one contract.  Indeed leafy green 
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growers are highly diversified, so it is likely that insurance for all types of leafy 
greens would be preferred.  This may decrease the price of the insurance through 
diversification.  However, this needs to be empirically tested. 
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APPENDIX A  
TIMELINE OF 2006 E. COLI OUTBREAK IN SPINACH  
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Date 
Reported 
Illnesses 
Deaths Recalls 
Number 
of States 
Affected 
Press Release Content 
9/14 50 1 None 8 
Initial announcement 
advising consumers that 
bagged spinach may be a 
possible source of E. coli 
outbreak.  FDA 
recommends consumers 
not eat fresh spinach 
until further notice. 
9/15 94 1 
Natural Selection 
Foods, Pro*Act, and 
Coastline 
20 
3 companies initiate 
recalls, states affected 
expanded to 20. 
9/16 102 1 
Natural Selection 
Foods, Coastline 
19 
Pro*Act removed from 
recalled brands. 
9/17 109 1 
Natural Selection 
Foods, River Ranch, 
Coastline 
19 
River Ranch initiates 
recall. 
9/18 114 1 
River Ranch, 
Natural Selection 
Foods, Coastline 
21 
Two recalls in effect and 
expansion of distributed 
product area to include 
21 states.  FDA 
announced that in light 
of the outbreak, spinach 
will be included in its 
Lettuce Safety Initiative 
9/19 131 1 
River Ranch, 
Natural Selection 
Foods 
21 
Updated information on 
the outbreak and 
involved parties.  
Coastline removed from 
the recalled brands. 
9/20 146 1 
River Ranch, Natural 
Selection Foods, RLB 
Distributors 
23 
DNA fingerprinting 
indicates that the source 
of E. coli 0157 is linked 
to “Dole Baby Spinach.”  
FDA continues to warn 
consumers to not eat 
fresh spinach. 
9/21 157 1 
River Ranch, Natural 
Selection Foods, RLB 
Distributors 
23 
Source of outbreak is 
determined to have come 
from spinach produced in 
Monterey, Santa Clara, 
and San Benito counties 
in California. 
9/22 166 1 
River Ranch, Natural 
Selection Foods, RLB 
Distributors 
25 
FDA announces that 
spinach from non-
affected counties is safe 
as well as processed 
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spinach. 
9/23 171 1 
River Ranch, Natural 
Selection Foods, RLB 
Distributors, Triple B 
Corporation, Pacific 
Coast Fruit Company 
25 
Two more companies 
announce recalls 
9/24 173 1 
River Ranch, Natural 
Selection Foods, RLB 
Distributors, Triple B 
Corporation, Pacific 
Coast Fruit Company 
25 
FDA advises consumers 
to not purchase spinach 
if they cannot verify that 
it was not grown in the 
affected counties. 
9/25 175 1 
River Ranch, Natural 
Selection Foods, RLB 
Distributors, Triple B 
Corporation, Pacific 
Coast Fruit Company 
25 
Updated information on 
the outbreak and 
involved parties. 
9/26 183 1 
River Ranch, Natural 
Selection Foods, RLB 
Distributors, Triple B 
Corporation, Pacific 
Coast Fruit Company 
26 
Affected states updated 
to include one more as 
well as a reported illness 
in Canada. 
9/29 187 1 
River Ranch, Natural 
Selection Foods, RLB 
Distributors, Triple B 
Corporation, Pacific 
Coast Fruit Company 
26 
FDA announces that all 
implicated spinach has 
been traced back Natural 
Selection Foods, LLC in 
San Juan Bautista, CA 
10/12 199 1 
River Ranch, Natural 
Selection Foods, RLB 
Distributors, Triple B 
Corporation, Pacific 
Coast Fruit Company 
26 
FDA releases test results 
indicating a genetic 
match between the E. 
coli. Strand implicated in 
the outbreak and that 
present in cattle feces on 
four fields of four 
ranches in San Benito 
and Monterey Counties, 
CA. 
Source: http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2006/default.htm
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APPENDIX B  
SPREADSHEET MODELING  
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The parameters for the Brownian Motion and Brownian Motion with Mean 
Reversion were estimated using SHAZAM Econometrics software.  The parameter 
estimates are then used to extrapolate the BM-MR process.  This is done using 
Pallisade’s @RISK for the Monte Carlo simulation.  This appendix illustrates the 
process of modeling in greater detail. 
 
Figure 7. Spreadsheet Setup of BM-MR 
 
Figure 7 shows how the spreadsheet was set up for the process.  The 
estimates are entered and referenced in each cell as part of the formula in (12).  The 
Monte Carlo is started through the Weiner process which includes a normally 
distributed error term in Column O.  In @RISK, the command for this is 
=RiskNormal(0,1). 
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Figure 8. Spreadsheet Formulas for BM-MR Changes 
 
Each week’s change is calculated by referencing the parameters in Column K 
and creating the changes in revenue according to (12) with a normally distributed 
error term in Column O.  Because some revenue values will end up being negative 
(this is bound to happen wth 5000 iterations), a simple “if” statement makes the 
revenues “0” if negative in Column L. 
To estimate the options values, the strike price is set, then the simulation is 
allowed to iterate 5,000 times.  If the revenue is less than the strike, a payout is 
made.  The average of these payouts is the option price.  An example of the vanilla 
put is provided in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9 . Put Option Setup 
 
For all options the setup consists of a strike price, the strike minus the 
revenue, the criteria (if the strike is less than the revenue the option is worthless), 
and the option price. The cost which is simply the option price scaled up by $1 
million. 
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Figure 10. Put Option Setup Formulas 
In this example, the option is triggered by the revenue at maturity (not path-
dependent).  To make this a path dependent option, would be to make K64 the 
average of the entire series (for the Asian) or the minimum of the entire series (for 
the lookback).  The Barriers are constructed the same way, but conditions the option 
payout on the probability of the barrier being reached in each week (a Bernoulli 
trial). 
 
Figure 11. Barrier and Variable Strike Setup 
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In order to condition the option values in Excel the barrier is given a 
probability and randomly assigned each week.  To incorporate a shock to demand, 
the spreadsheet is setup to reference the Column P and reduce the revenue in that 
particular week by any percent desired, if there is a shock to demand (a value of “1”) 
in Column U.  So if there is “1” in the Barrier recall column, there is a chance (in 
Column U) that revenues will decline by some percentage.  The frequency is based 
on a count of all recalls spanning the weekly data.  This gives a frequency of 19 
recalls every 427weeks.  Of the recalls initiated one corresponded to a large, 
negative market impact so it is given a frequency of once every 19 recalls.   
 
 
Figure 12. Barrier and Variable Strike Setup Formulas 
 
The pricing methodology remains the same, with a simple “if” statement 
embedded into the criteria so that “if” the barrier is reached (a value of 1 anywhere 
in the Column P), then an indemnity is allowed to occur.  For the variable strike 
options, the strike price is the average at the week when the barrier is reached. 
Figure 13. Barrier Option Values Formulas 
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The variable strike is identified using a “vlookup” statement which will 
return the average weekly value at the point the barrier is reached.  The only real 
difference between the barrier option valuation is the addition of the IF statement 
which lets the option be triggered only if the sum of Column P is greater than zero.  
Doing this makes the option cheaper as the barrier must first be reached before an 
insurance payout is triggered.
  
